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NOTES
RECOVERING COSTS FOR CLEANING Up HAzARDous
WASTE SITES: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE SUPERLIEN
STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
As the number of hazardous waste sites' and the danger posed by them
become more widely known, the pressure on state environmental agencies
to clean up the sites will undoubtedly increase. 2 The United States Congress
has passed environmental legislation which provides federal funds for cleanup
of hazardous waste sites.' However, this federal legislation has not adequately
met states' needs for protecting the environment and recovering costs for
cleaning up hazardous waste sites. 4 Consequently, many states have passed
environmental legislation modeled upon the federal acts.' When a state
environmental agency cleans up a hazardous waste site, the agency tries to
recover the costs of cleanup from the owner or other party responsible for
the site.6 Because of the conflicting policy goals of environmental legislation
1. For a statutory definition of hazardous waste, see Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982) [hereinafter RCRA or RCRA of 1976]. Generally,
the definition includes waste which may cause or contribute to death, or serious illness.
2. The number of hazardous waste sites listed by the EPA was reported to be approximately
26,000, while the General Accounting Office has estimated that the number could reach 368,000
if a more thorough inventory were taken. Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability
for Landowners, 73 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1987, at 66, 67. See also S. EPsTEIN, L. BROWN & C.
POPE, HAZARDOus WASTE IN AMERICA 302 (1984) (estimating between 32,000 and 51,000 po-
tentially hazardous waste sites identified in the United States) [hereinafter S. EPsTEIN].
3. See, e.g., RCRA of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987. See also The Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) (com-
monly referred to as CERCLA, but recently reauthorized as Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act). For a general discussion of CERCLA's scheme, see Drabkin, Moorman
& Kirsch, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat Creditor, 15 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,168, 10,169-71 (June 1986).
4. See Warren, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Comple-
nent, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,348 (Nov. 1983) ("Some states have passed their
own laws to supplement [CERCLA], which falls short of the comprehensive scheme initially
envisioned by its sponsors.").
5. See id. (listing and discussing state law equivalents to CERCLA and their interaction
with the federal law).
6. See, e.g., Kessler v. Tarrats, 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (1983), aff'd, 194 N.J.
Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326 (1984).
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and bankruptcy laws, however, state environmental agencies have encoun-
tered difficulties in recovering costs of cleanup when the party responsible
for the hazardous waste site has declared bankruptcy. 7
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19788 is intended to provide the debtor
with a "fresh start" while still assuring equitable treatment of creditors.9
Several provisions in the Bankruptcy Code (or the Code) afford financial
protection for an entity with liabilities for hazardous waste cleanup. 0 Use
of these various provisions of the Code to avoid hazardous waste liability
has caused much discussion and debate concerning the conflict of bankruptcy
law and environmental protection policy."
In an effort to ensure that state environmental agencies can recover costs
for cleaning up hazardous waste sites when the party responsible for the site
has declared bankruptcy, at least three states have enacted statutes which
7. See Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code
by Industrial Polluters, 85 CoLum. L. Rav. 870 (1985).
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)).
9. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1977) (the purposes of the Code are "to
convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors and then to give
the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left untouched"
(quoting Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913))). Notice, however; that the "fresh
start" policy is not applicable to corporate debtors because the 1978 Act does not contain a
provision for the discharge of debts of non-individuals. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982) (debtor
must be individual for provision to apply). See also Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in
Bankruptcy Law, 98 HIARv. L. REv. 1393 (1985); Note, Clean-up Orders and the Bankruptcy
Code: An Exception to the Automatic Stay, 59 ST. Jon's L. Rav. 292, 293 n.4 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Clean-up Orders]. For a general discussion of the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Code and environmental legislation, see Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous
Waste Cleanup: An Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 165 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup].
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (the Automatic Stay Provision-see infra
notes 29-52 and accompanying text); id. § 554 (the Abandonment Provision-see infra notes
53-70 and accompanying text); id. § 105(a) (the Discretionary Stay Provision-see infra notes
71-82 and accompanying text). See also Drabkin, Moorman, & Kirsch, supra note 3, at 10,171-
73.
11. See generally Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 1199 (1984); Hoffman, Environmental Protection and Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: Toward
a Better Compromise, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671 (1984); Klein, Hazardous Waste Liability and the
Bankruptcy Code, 10 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 533 (1986); Rosenbaum, Bankruptcy and Envi-
ronmental Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099 (Apr.
1983); Zarin, State Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs and Bankruptcy: The Con-
stitutionality of Retroactive State Super-Priority Lien Statutes, 90 CoM. L.J. 346, 350 (1985);
Note, supra note 7; Note, Clean-up Orders, supra note 9; Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps:
Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1037 (1985); Note, Priority Lien
Statutes: The States' Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Generators, 31 WAsH. U.J. URB.
& CONTEmp. L. 373, 382 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Priority Lien Statutes]; Note, The Bankruptcy
Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, supra note 9; Comment, State "Superlien " Statutes: An
Attempt to Resolve the Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and Environmental Law, 59
TEMP. L.Q. 981, 989-96 (1986).
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give the state a priority lien against the bankrupt party.1 2 Under these priority
liens, or "superliens," the holder of the lien (the state) collects reimbursement
costs for cleaning up the hazardous waste site before other creditors are
satisfied.'
These priority liens, however, raise certain constitutional questions. First,
do such liens work to effect a "taking" without just compensation in
contravention of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution, as
applied to the states via the fourteenth amendment,' 4 or do they represent
a valid exercise of the states' police powers and thus relieve the states from
any obligation to pay compensation? The fifth amendment provides in per-
tinent part: "No person shall be... deprived of... property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'" The United States Supreme Court has held the police
power "to include everything essential to the public safety, health, and
morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings,
of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance.' 6 Because of the high
cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site, 7 there is the possibility that after
cleanup costs are recovered by the state, there will be no money left in the
bankrupt's estate for creditors to recover. The inquiry must focus on whether
the creditors have suffered a taking without just compensation.
The second issue presented is whether the state superliens act as an un-
constitutional impairment of contract rights.'8 Article I of the Constitution
provides in part that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."' 9 In this context, creditors argue that by lending
money to hazardous waste site operators, the creditors have contracted for
repayment of the money. The state superlien statutes, the argument contin-
ues, destroy or impair this right because once the state's lien takes priority,
there is nothing left in the estate to allow creditors to recover their money,
thus effectively destroying the contract between the creditor and the operator.
The contracts clause issue also forces the courts to examine the states' police
12. See, e.g., Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response
Act, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1987); New Hampshire Solid and Hazardous
Waste Management Act, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b (Equity Supp. 1987); New
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.llf(f) (West Supp.
1987).
13. The exact wording of the statute is important in determining against whom the lien
applies. See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment's restriction on taking property was
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894).
17. The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated the average expenditure per su-
perfund site at close to $12 million. Drabkin, Moorman, & Kirsch, supra note 3, at 10,169
(citing 49 Fed. Reg. 40,320, 40,325 (1984)).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
19. Id.
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powers. Answering the police powers question necessarily involves courts in
an examination of the dangers posed by the particular hazardous waste site
and the interests protected by the bankruptcy code.
This Note first examines the relevant protections offered by the Bankruptcy
Code to debtors with hazardous waste liabilities2° and the outer limits of
two of those protections as determined by two recent Supreme Court de-
cisions. 21 The Note next examines superlien statutes passed by state legis-
latures and the differences in language among the statutes. 22 The Note then
addresses the constitutional problems posed by superlien statutes.23 The "tak-
ing" question and the contracts clause question will be examined in the light
of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,24 a recent Supreme
Court decision discussing the relevant analysis under these constitutional
provisions. The Note concludes that, with the exception of secured creditors
who have a property interest of value which was perfected before the en-
actment of the state's priority lien statute, the superlien provisions can meet
constitutional requirements and therefore represent a positive step toward
alleviating the problems posed by hazardous waste sites.
I. BANKRUPTCY CODE PROTECTIONS FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE
LIABILITY
When examining the Code, it is important to keep in mind the policies it
is intended to promote. The primary purpose of the Code is to conserve the
debtor's estate25 for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. 26 The Code is also
designed to allow debtors breathing room to recover from their financial
difficulties and re-attain commercial success.2 7 Furthermore, the Code serves
to ensure an orderly and equitable presentation of creditors' claims. 8
A. Section 362: The Automatic Stay Provision
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, section 362 of the Code creates an
automatic "stay" on any further proceedings which might disrupt a creditor's
20. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
21. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986);
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
22. See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 114-206 and accompanying text.
24. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
25. The commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding creates an estate which includes all
legal or equitable property interests of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982). See also
Lockett, Environmental Liability Enforcement and the Bankruptcy Act of 1978: A Study of
H.R. 2767, The "Superlien" Provision, 19 REAL PROP. & PROB. J. 859, 869 n.64 (1984).
26. See In re McGoldrick, 121 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 675 (1941)
("The fundamental purpose of the acts relating to bankruptcies is to conserve the properties
for the benefit of debtor and creditors alike or to reduce the assets to cash for distribution
among the creditors." (quoting In re Ostlind Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Or. 1937))).
27. Lockett, supra note 25, at 869-70.
28. Id. at 869.
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position relative to a debtor's estate.29 The automatic stay provision has
given rise to most of the conflicts between bankruptcy law and environmental
regulations.30 This section of the Code was designed to prevent a "race to
the courthouse" by creditors hoping to cash in their claims on a first-come
first-served basis. 3 Section 362, however, does allow various exceptions to
the automatic stay provision.32
Of the various exceptions to the section 362 automatic stay provision,
there are two situations where claims involving environmental concerns may
be excepted.33 First, if a governmental unit 34 commences or continues an
action to enforce its police or regulatory powers to protect public health or
safety, the automatic stay does not apply.35 Second, if the action is to enforce
a judgment which is not a "money judgment," where such non-money
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Filing a bankruptcy petition acts as a stay
of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case ....
Id.
30. See Drabkin, Moorman, & Kirsch, supra note 3, at 10,182.
31. See Legislative History, 11 U.S.C. § 362, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
340-42 (1977); S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51, 54-55 (1978). See also Paige, In
Re Quanta Resources Corp.: Bankruptcy Policy v. Environmental Interests; A Polluted Judicial
Theory, 59 AM. BArNKR. L.J. 357, 372-73 (1985).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982).
33. Section 362(b) states in pertinent part:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title ... does not
operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or contin-
uation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such gov-
ernmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
Id. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1982). For an examination of how courts have interpreted and applied
these exceptions, see Comment, Bankruptcy Law-When Is a Governmental Unit's Action to
Enforce Its Police or Regulatory Power Exempt from the Automatic Stay Provisions of Section
362, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 369 (1981).
34. Section 101(21) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "governmental unit" as including
federal, state and municipal governments and their instrumentalities. 11 U.S.C. § 101(21) (1978).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982). The legislative history of section 362 indicates that Congress
intended environmental laws to be considered police and regulatory powers. See H.R. Rep.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEWS
5787, 6299 ("[WV]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of
... environmental protection ... safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting
to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the
automatic stay.").
1988]
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judgment is obtained as a result of a legitimate exercise of police or regulatory
powers, the automatic stay will not be enforced.3 6 Thus, if the government
is merely pursuing an action to protect its pecuniary interests in the debtor's
property, the stay will not apply. a7 Some courts have held that if a state
seeks to enforce an injunction which serves to protect the public's health,
safety, or welfare, this order will not be subject to the automatic stay.38
The United States Supreme Court recently held, in Ohio v. Kovacs,39 that
a pre-petition order against an individual debtor to force him to clean up
his hazardous waste site constituted a "money judgment." Therefore, the
debt was dischargeable 4° under section 362, where the bankrupt debtor had
been dispossessed of the site by a state appointed receiver. In Kovacs, Ohio
sued the Chem-Dyne Corporation and its senior officer, William Kovacs,
for violations of Ohio's environmental laws arising from operation of a
hazardous waste site.41 Kovacs then signed a stipulation and judgment entry
which required him to clean up the waste site.42 When Kovacs failed to
comply within the cleanup obligations, the state appointed a receiver to take
control of Kovacs' assets and to implement the judgment to clean up the
waste site.43
After the appointment of the receiver, but before the cleanup order was
completed, Kovacs filed for bankruptcy. 44 Ohio filed a motion in state court
to determine Kovacs' income and assets, hoping to develop a basis for
requiring Kovacs' post-petition income to be applied toward carrying out
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). See Lockett, supra note 25, at 871. A "money judgment"
has been defined as "one which adjudges the payment of a sum of money, as distinguished
from one directing an act to be done or property to be transferred or restored." United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Fort Misery Highway Dist., 22 F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1927). In
Ohio v. Kovacs, the Supreme Court held that an individual debtor's obligation to clean up a
hazardous waste site amounted to a money judgment and was dischargeable under the Code.
469 U.S. 274 (1985). See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
37. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 382.
38. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1984). In Penn Terra, the court held that an order forcing Penn Terra, a bankrupt coal mine
operator, to restore strip-mined property was not a money judgment, and therefore was not
dischargeable under section 362(b)(5). The court decided that the injunctive order was intended
to prevent future harm to the environment, rather than compensation for past damage. Id. at
277. For a general discussion of the conflicts and discrepancies of court decisions interpreting
the meaning of section 362 of the Code, see Comment, supra note 11, at 989-96.
39. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
40. As stated by the Court: "Except for the nine kinds of debts saved from discharge by
11 U.S.C. § 523(a), a discharge in bankruptcy discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before bankruptcy. [11 U.S.C.] § 727(b)." Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 278.
41. Id. at 275.
42. Id. at 276.
43. Id.
44. Id. Kovacs initially filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1145, but converted the petition to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, id.
§ 112. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276 n.l.
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the clean-up order.45 In reply, Kovacs invoked section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code and requested the bankruptcy court to stay the state court proceedings;
the bankruptcy court granted the stay4 6 Ohio claimed that the enforcement
order was not a "claim" for a money judgment and therefore should not
be dischargeable. 47 The bankruptcy court rejected Ohio's argument and the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Ohio essentially sought
a monetary judgment from Kovacs and that such monetary judgments are
dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.48 The Supreme Court affirmed. 49
The importance of the Kovacs decision for the purposes of this Note lies
in the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor.50 Sensing that the Court's
decision might be misinterpreted as precluding any effective action by states
to enforce environmental actions, Justice O'Connor pointed out that:
[b]ecause "Congress has generally left the determination of property
rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state lav," the classification
of Ohio's interest as either a lien on the property itself, a perfected
security interest, or merely an unsecured claim depends on Ohio law. ...
Thus a state may protect its interest in the enforcement of its environ-
mental laws by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or
secured claims.,
The various state superlien statutes discussed in Section II below are examples
of the statutory liens to which Justice O'Connor refers in her concurrence.12
45. Id. at 276.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 277.
48. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983). However, in Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department
of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984), the court held that section 362 did not apply
to the state's request for an injunction against a bankrupt to require compliance with the
environmental laws. In Penn Terra, the state action was held to be an effort to enforce the
police power of the state, not a suit to enforce a money judgment. Id. at 277.
In Kovacs, the Supreme Court distinguished Penn Terra stating, "in [Penn Terra] there had
been no appointment of a receiver who had the duty to comply with the state law and who
was seeking money from the bankrupt. The automatic stay provision ... is another matter."
Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283 n.11.
49. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 274. The Court, however, was careful to limit its holding and
pointed out what it was not deciding. First, Kovacs' discharge would not shield him from
prosecution for having violated the environmental laws of Ohio, nor for not performing his
obligations under the injunction prior to bankruptcy. Second, had a fine been imposed prior
to bankruptcy, the act of filing bankruptcy would not have relieved Kovacs of the obligation
for that fine. Third, the Court did not address what the legal consequences would have been
had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed and a trustee had been
designated with the usual duties of a bankruptcy trustee. Fourth, the Court did not hold that
the injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the premises or against any conduct
that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's waters is dischargeable in
bankruptcy; the Court only addressed the affirmative duty to clean up the site and the duty
to pay money to that end. Finally, the Court stated that it did not question that anyone in
possession of the site would have to comply with the environmental laws of Ohio. Id. at 284-
85.
50. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. (citation omitted). See also Baird & Jackson, supra note 11, at 1205-08.
52. See infra notes 82-113 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Protections Afforded by the Bankruptcy Code
1. Section 554: The Abandonment Provision
Under section 554 of the Code, 53 a trustee or any party in interest 54 may,
on motion and after notice and hearing, abandon any property of the
bankrupt estate which is "burdensome" or of "inconsequential value to the
estate."' 55 "Burdensome" property is property that is essentially worthless
because it is heavily subject to taxes, liens, or other encumbrances, while
"inconsequential" means the debtor lacks equity in the property. 56 Section
554, however, does not give a trustee or the bankruptcy court the authority
to avoid compliance with pertinent nonbankruptcy law. 57 The United States
Supreme Court recently addressed the question of a trustee's power of
abandonment in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection.58 In Midlantic, the Court held that "a trustee
may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from
identified hazards." 5 9
In Midlantic, the debtor, Quanta Resources Corporation, owned and op-
erated waste oil processing centers in New York and New Jersey, which were
regulated by state environmental agencies. 60 Nearly 500,000 gallons of PCB-
contaminated oil were improperly stored at the facilities. 61 The New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection ordered Quanta to cease opera-
tions, and Quanta and the state began negotiating the cleanup of the fa-
cilities. 62 Before the conclusion of the negotiations, however, Quanta filed
53. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
54. To qualify as a "party in interest," a creditor must hold a possessory interest in the
property. See Martin, Creditor Alternatives to Obtain Relief from Automatic Stays in Bank-
ruptcy, 87 CoM. L.J. 22, 34 (1982). See also Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at
385-86.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). Section 554(a) provides: "After notice and a hearing, the trustee
may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value to the estate." Id. § 554(a) (1982).
56. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 384 (citing Martin, supra note 54,
at 34).
57. See Morris, State Enforcement of Environmental Laws Against Bankrupt Entities, 16
ENvmL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,143, 10,145 (1986).
58. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). A companion case to Midlantic was decided the same day; O'Neil
v. New York, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), aff'g Quanta Resources Corp. v. New York, 739 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1984).
59. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507.
60. Id. at 496-97.
61. Id. at 497. More than 400,000 gallons of the oil contaminated with PCBs (polychlorinated
biphenyls, highly toxic carcinogens) were found at the New Jersey site, while over 70,000 gallons
of contaminated oil were found at the New York Facility. Id.
62. Id.
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for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and one month
later changed the action to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. Pur-
suant to Chapter 7, a trustee was appointed to oversee the estate.6 No party
disputed the trustee's claim that the contaminated oil was "burdensome"
to the estate.64 The state, however, argued that abandonment would threaten
the public health and safety, pointing out that when a trustee abandons
burdensome property, the interest in the property reverts to the debtor
corporation. 65 Because the corporation's assets had become the property of
the estate, however, the corporation did not have the financial resources to
comply with the requirements of the New York environmental laws requiring
cleanup of the waste site.66 Consequently, if the trustee were allowed to
abandon the property, that action would amount to an illegal disposal of
hazardous waste under New York law. 67 The state also argued that allowing
abandonment would be contrary to public policy, as evidenced by local and
state environmental laws, and by the requirement of section 959(b) of the
Judicial Code, which states that the trustee "shall manage and operate the
property in his possession ... according to the valid laws of the State." 6
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disallowed the abandonment, opting
for environmental protection over strict application of the abandonment
provision.69 Although the Midlantic decision indicates a policy choice away
from unlimited protection of bankrupt entities toward protecting the public
from the dangers posed by hazardous wastes, recent bankruptcy decisions
have attempted to narrow the scope of the decision. 70 The conflict, therefore,
continues between protecting the bankrupt and his creditors and protecting
the public health.
63. Id.
64. Id. ("Since the mortgages on [the New York] facility's real property exceeded the
property's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil plainly rendered the property
a net burden to the estate.").
65. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 914.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing N.Y. ENvTL. CONsERV. LAw § 71-2702 (McKinney Supp. 1982)).
68. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 498. Section 959(b) of the Judicial Code provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as
such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner
or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
69. The majority's decision is vigorously attacked by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the
Midlantic decision, see Klein, supra note 11.
70. See, e.g., In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986)
(bankruptcy court should consider, but not be strictly bound by, state environmental laws when
deciding whether to permit abandonment); In re Franklin Signal Corp., No. BKY 4-85-935
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1986) (where hazardous wastes posed no imminent danger to public health
and safety, abandonment allowed).
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2. Section 105: The Discretionary Stay
If an automatic stay is not issued under section 362,'7 a debtor may seek
a discretionary stay under section 105(a) of the Code.72 This provision allows
a bankruptcy court to stay actions, including environmental protection law-
suits, if the stay is necessary to carry out other provisions of the Code. 73
The discretionary stay, however, should only be granted after some type of
adjudicatory hearing applying the traditional rules for obtaining a preliminary
injunction. 74
Perhaps in keeping with the spirit of section 105, courts have exercised
considerable discretion in granting such stays. Generally, courts have allowed
the stay where an enforcement action is likely to imperil the estate's assets
and the creditors' priorities. 75 When the debtor has been violating environ-
mental laws, however, courts have been less willing to grant the stay.76 But
stays have been issued in cases which could be viewed as contrary to public
safety and welfare, 77 and when this happens, the stay may be challenged as
a violation of section 959(b) of the Judicial Code. 7 The use of the discre-
tionary stay does not appear to be as active an area of avoidance in bank-
ruptcy law as either the automatic stay79 or the abandonment provision. 0
State environmental agencies are faced with the same question in dealing
with all three provisions of the Bankruptcy Code: How can the state ensure
reimbursement for its cleanup efforts once the party responsible for the
hazardous waste site has declared bankruptcy?8' State superlien statutes
71. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982). See supra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
73. See Morris, supra note 57, at 10143-44. See also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
74. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmw. NEws 5837; H.R. RP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEws 6298 ("By excepting an act or action from the [section 362] automatic
stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee move the court into action.... [The court will
have to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular action which may be harming
the estate should be stayed.").
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones (In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248, 1251
(9th Cir. 1979).
76. See Morris, supra note 57, at 10145.
77. Id. (citing Turner Brothers, Inc. v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mines, No. 85-0053 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 1985)).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982) (for the text of the statute, see supra note 68). But seeQuanta, 739 F.2d at 926 n.5 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 959(b) should not
apply to Chapter 7 proceedings).
79. See supra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
81. Under CERCLA, the federal government pays 90% of cleanup costs and the state pays
10%. But this funding only applies for sites which qualify under CERCLA, and given the high
cost of cleaning these sites, 10% is no small sum. See Warren, supra note 4, at 10,357.
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represent an attempt by the states to address the problems of protecting the
environment and recovering costs for hazardous waste cleanup.
s2
II. STATE SUPERLMEN STATUTES: LANGUAGE AND OPERATION
The Bankruptcy Code provides for an orderly presentation of creditors'
claims and attempts to prioritize those claims.8 3 State superlien statutes
represent an attempt by the states to place the state ahead of other creditors
in collecting money under the Code. At least three states have passed some
form of superlien statute.8 The statutes vary somewhat in their language,
and these differences can be used to point out the problems associated with
the statutes. Three important factors to consider when examining superlien
statutes are the time at which the lien becomes effective, the types of costs
recoverable under the lien, and the particular property to which the lien
attaches."s
Determining when a lien becomes effective is important for at least two
reasons. First, the time at which a lien becomes perfected determines whether
a trustee may "avoid" the lien under section 545(2) of the Code.8 6 Section
545(2) allows a trustee to avoid any statutory lien which is not perfected
before the bankruptcy petition is filed.87 Liens which arise under the state
priority lien legislation are statutory liens.8 8 If the lien is avoided under
section 545, the lien becomes an unsecured claim, and the government's
claim would receive low priority under the Code, possibly precluding the
82. On the federal level, Rep. James Florio introduced a bill, in 1983, H.R. 2767, which
would have given the federal government a superlien. There were problems associated with the
bill and the superlien provision was ultimately dropped. See Schwenke, Public Notice and
Governmental Liens for Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups, 14 ABA PROB. & PROP. No. 1, at 7
(1985). See also Lockett, supra note 25.
83. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1982).
84. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 12.
85. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. R-v. 1458, 1599-
1660 (1986).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982). Section 545(2) states in relevant part:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to
the extent that such lien-
(2) is not perfected or enforceable on the date of the filing of the petition
against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property on the date of the
filing of the petition, whether or not such a purchaser exists; ....
Id.
87. Id.
88. Section 101(39) of the Bankruptcy Code defines a statutory lien as a:
lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions
.. but does not include security interests or judicial lien whether or not such
interest or lien is provided by or is dependent on a statute and whether or not
such interest or lien is made fully effective by statute.
Id. § 101(39) (1982).
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state from any recovery at all, thus defeating the whole purpose of the
superlien provision. 9
Under all three superlien statutes, the state's lien becomes perfected" when
the lien is filed by the state with the appropriate state official. 91 As long as
the state's lien is recorded before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the
trustee may not avoid the lien under section 545(2).92 There are, however,
89. See Lockett, supra note 25, at 883.
90. A lien is perfected when its right of priority is secured. See Developments in the Law-
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 85, at 1600 n. 161 (citing J. EDDY & P. WINSHm, COMMERCIAL
TRANSACnONS 100-01 (1985)).
91. The relevant portions of these statutes are set out below. Chapter 147-B:10-b III of the
New Hampshire Revised Statutes provides in pertinent part:
III. The priority of the lien created by this section shall be as follows:
(a) As to the real property on which the hazardous waste or hazardous material
is located, the lien shall constitute a first priority lien against such real property
prior to all encumbrances, whether of record or inchoate, when the notice of lien
is recorded in the registry of deeds for the county in which such real property is
located and the notice of lien identifies the record owner of such real property.
(b) As to the business revenues generated from the facility on which hazardous
waste or hazardous material is located, the lien shall constitute a first priority
lien against such business revenues or personal property, prior to all encumbrances,
whether of record or inchoate when the notice of lien is filed with the secretary
of state and the notice of lien identifies the owner of such personal property.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b III (Equity Supp'. 1987).
Section 58:10-23.11f(f) of the New Jersey Statute provides in pertinent part:
Any expenditures made by the administrator pursuant to this act shall constitute
in each instance, a debt of the discharger to the fund. The debt shall constitute
a lien on all property owned by the discharger when a notice of lien, incorporating
a description of the property of the discharger subject to the cleanup and removal
and an identification of the amount to cleanup, removal and related costs expended
from the fund is duly filed with the clerk of the Superior Court .... Upon entry
[of the notice of the lien filed by the state] by the clerk, the lien, to the amount
committed by the administrator for cleanup and removal, shall attach to the
revenues and all real and personal property of the discharger, whether or not the
discharger is insolvent.
The notice of lien filed pursuant to this subsection which affects the property
of a discharger subject to the cleanup and removal of a discharge shall create a
lien with priority over all other claims or liens which are or have been filed against
the property, except if the property comprises six dwelling units or less and is
used exclusively for residential purposes, this notice of lien shall not affect any
valid lien, right or interest in the property filed in accordance with established
procedure prior to the filing of this notice of lien.
N.J. STAT ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West Supp. 1987).
Chapter 21E, section 13, of the Massachusetts Laws provides in pertinent part:
Any lien recorded, registered or filed pursuant to this section shall have priority
over any encumbrance theretofore recorded, registered or filed with respect to
any site, other than real property the greater part of which is devoted to single
or multi-family housing, . . . but as to all other real property shall be subject to
encumbrances or other interests recorded, registered or filed prior to the record,
registration or filing of such statement, and as to all other personal property shall
be subject to the priority rules [of the Massachusetts Laws].
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E § 13 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (1982).
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two situations in which a trustee may be able to avoid a superlien under
section 545(2). First, if the bankruptcy petition is filed before the cleanup
activities begin, then the state will not satisfy the requirement that the lien
be filed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. In most cases, however,
initiation of cleanup activities has begun before the filing of bankruptcy
petitions, so this scenario seems unlikely to occur.93 The second, and perhaps
more likely, situation is that in which the state begins cleanup of a hazardous
waste site, but simply neglects to file its lien as required under the superlien
statute. If the owner of the hazardous waste site files for bankruptcy before
the state records its lien, then presumably the bankruptcy trustee may avoid
the lien under section 545(2). Here again, however, assuming a reasonable
amount of diligence by state officials, this seems unlikely to occur.
The second reason for the importance of establishing when the lien becomes
effective may be demonstrated by examining a problem that arose under the
original version of the Massachusetts superlien law.94 The Massachusetts
statute has probably created the greatest amount of controversy and publicity
surrounding superlien statutes.9 Under the original version, after the state
had incurred expenses cleaning up hazardous waste, there was a ninety-day
period during which the state could file a claim describing the property to
which the lien would apply.96 The ninety-day filing period caused problems,
however, because there was a gap of up to ninety days during which a buyer
of property could not determine his or her ownership position. 97 Because of
the uncertainty surrounding real estate purchases, the ninety-day provision
was eliminated from the statute, and the statute now provides that the lien
is perfected when filed. 98
Establishing the types of costs recoverable under a priority lien is important
because those costs indicate what limitations are placed on the state envi-
ronmental agencies in obtaining money ahead of other creditors. Under the
Massachusetts statute for example, the state may file a priority lien to recover
not only expenses incurred in cleaning up a waste site, but also may charge
twelve percent interest per year on the debt. 99 The New Jersey and New
Hampshire statutes, on the other hand, allow recovery only for expenses
93. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). In both of these cases, the cleanup activities
had begun before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
94. For a quotation of the original version of the statute, see Schwenke & Lockett, Superlien
"Solutions" to Hazardous Waste: Bankruptcy Conflicts, Q. NEWSLETTER oF TnE ABA STAnNG
COMMITTEE ON EivTm. LAw 1, 4 n.6 (Winter 1983-84).
95. Id. at 3.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21E § 13 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
99. Id. See also Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 94, at 3.
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incurred pursuant to cleaning up the waste site, and do not include penalties
or interest charges. 100
The third characteristic of superlien statutes to consider-the type of
property to which the lien attaches-has a direct bearing on how likely it
is that the state will actually recover its expenses. Under the original Mas-
sachusetts statute, the state could file a lien against all real and personal
property of the liable person, including property presently owned or after
acquired. 10 The broad language as to what property could be affected by
the liens caused the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation to withdraw from
certain real estate markets in Massachusetts'02 and led to a revision of the
act. 103 The revised act affects only property on the hazardous waste site; it
does not apply to subsequently acquired property owned by the liable party,
or other real or personal property. 1 4 Under this approach, the state is limited
in the amount of reimbursement it can recover because the value of the
hazardous waste site may be limited.
The New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act is perhaps the strong-
est superlien provision enacted thus far. 05 Proper recordation of the lien
creates a lien which "shall attach to the revenues and all real and personal
property of the discharger," and "shall create a lien with priority over all
other claims or liens which are or have been filed against the property,"
with an exception for certain residential property.106 Thus, if the costs of
cleanup exceed the value of the contaminated site itself, the state can recover
from other property of the discharger as well. By providing that the lien
may attach to other property of the discharger, and that the lien will have
priority over other claims or liens, the New Jersey legislature appears to
100. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b (Equity Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
58:10-23.11f(f) (West Supp. 1987).
101. See Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 94, at 3.
102. Id. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation withdrew from the condominium
and apartment secondary mortgage market in Massachusetts, and threatened other withdrawals
if the legislature failed to amend the superlien statute.
103. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E § 13 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
104. Id.
105. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.llf(f) (West Supp. 1987).
106. Id. The statute provides in relevant part:
Upon entry [of the notice of the lien filed by the state] by the clerk, the lien, to
the amount committed by the administrator for cleanup and removal, shall attach
to the revenues and all real and personal property of the discharger, whether or
not the discharger is insolvent.
The notice of lien filed pursuant to this subsection which affects the property
of a discharger subject to the cleanup and removal of a discharge shall create a
lien with priority over all other claims or liens which are or have been filed against
the property, except if the property comprises six dwelling units or less and is
used exclusively for residential purposes, this notice of lien shall not affect any
valid lien, right or interest in the property filed in accordance with established
procedure prior to the filing of this notice of lien.
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have understood that the cost of cleanup might exceed the value of the waste
site and took steps to ensure that the lien take priority ahead of secured
creditors.? 7 Although the New Jersey superlien statute affects all real and
personal property of the discharger, it is important to realize that the statute
is limited to the discharger, and does not apply to subsequent purchasers
of the contaminated property.108 The New Jersey superlien has survived a
challenge to its constitutionality in state courts.1°9
Under the New Hampshire superlien provision, the lien may attach to
business revenues and all real and personal property of any person liable
under the state's hazardous waste fund law." 0 The statute grants the state
a first priority lien, prior to all encumbrances, against the hazardous waste
.site itself, as well as any business revenues generated from the facility which
is located on the site, and any personal property located on the site.' As
to all other property which is not located on the site, the lien is an ordinary
lien without first priority." 2
Having examined the operation of the superlien statutes, it is now possible
to explore the constitutional challenges to the statutes under the fifth amend-
ment's "taking" clause and the contracts clause." 3
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Ohio v. Kovacs in-
dicates that states may protect their interests in enforcing environmental laws
by giving cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens or secured claims, 1 4
107. See Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 94, at 4.
108. Id.
109. See Kessler v. Tarrats, 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super.
136, 476 A.2d 326 (1984) (discussed infra notes 121-26, 143-44, 206 and accompanying text).
110. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b I (Equity Supp. 1987) (providing that "[t]he
division of waste management shall have a lien upon the business revenues and all real and
personal property of any person subject to liability under RSA 147-B:10, I for all costs incurred
by the state pursuant to RSA 147-B:10, II").
111. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b III (Equity Supp. 1987). For the text of the
statute, see supra note 91.
112. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 147-B:10-b III(c) (Equity Supp. 1987). This section provides:
As to all other property, whether real, personal or business revenues, other than
that which is described in subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph, the notice
of lien shall constitute a lien that is effective as of the date and time of recording
or filing, without priority on antecedent encumbrances of record when the notice
of lien is properly recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds or filed with the
secretary of state.
Id.
113. For a discussion of whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts state superlien statutes via
the supremacy clause, see Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 389-90 (arguing that
superlien statutes work within the Code and therefore are not preempted by the Code).
114. Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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that opinion begins, rather than ends, the inquiry. There are still potential
constitutional barriers to the operation of the statutes which must be ad-
dressed.
A. Fifth Amendment "Taking" Problems
Perhaps the most serious constitutional question concerning superlien sta-
tutes is whether they constitute a governmental "taking" without just com-
pensation in violation of the fifth amendment as applied to states via the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." 5 The argument in this
context is that given the high cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site," 6
once the government recoups its cleanup expenses, there will be nothing left
of the estate to satisfy the claims of other creditors. Therefore, because the
creditors have been deprived of their property (their repayment money) for
a public use (reimbursing the state environmental agency for its cleanup)
without just compensation, an unconstitutional taking has occurred.
1. General Considerations
When examining the effects and constitutionality of a superlien statute,
it is first necessary to determine whether the lien is operating against (or
being challenged by) an unsecured creditor or a secured creditor." 7 The
secured creditor has both recognized property rights in the collateral as well
as contractual rights to repayment."' The unsecured creditor, however, has
only contractual rights and thus has no property rights to be protected by
the fifth amendment." 9 It is the secured creditor, then, who is entitled to
challenge a superlien statute as violating the fifth amendment's taking clause.
Once a secured creditor challenges the superlien statute as violating the
taking clause, it is necessary to determine whether the superlien takes priority
over other liens only on the contaminated property or on uncontaminated
property as well. 20 At the same time, of course, it is necessary to find out
exactly what property interest the secured creditor has. If the security interest
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.").
116. One estimate puts the average cost of final disposal of hazardous wastes at $25.9 million
per site. S. EPsTEIN, supra note 2, at 203. See Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, supra note 9, at 165 n.1.
117. See generally Paige, supra note 31, at 380-83 (discussing the rights of secured and
unsecured creditors).
118. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982) (the bundle of rights of
a secured creditor is protected by the taking clause).
119. Id. at 74 (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). See also Paige, supra note 31, at 380 n.176.
120. See Drabkin, Moorman, & Kirsch, supra note 3, at 10,179.
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affected involves only the contaminated property, it is still possible to avoid
a constitutional challenge by arguing that the government's action in cleaning
up the site actually restored or improved the value of the property. The
New Jersey Superior Court made this very point in Kessler v. Tarrats,'2 l a
recent case which held that the New Jersey superlien statute' 2 did not effect
a taking. The Kessler court further held that the statute did not impair the
contract rights of the assignee of a mortgage which was recorded before the
statute was enacted.'2 In its discussion, the court stated:
The presence of the [hazardous waste] in a real sense destroyed what
economic value the premises may have had until it was removed.
The work done by [the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection] had the effect of restoring the economic value to the subject
premises....
In a realistic sense, the priority provision prevents some from enjoying
a windfall at the expense of the public.'24
The court noted that priority lien statutes have been analogized to maritime
and mechanics' liens; these liens are given priority because they add or
preserve value with respect to the property involved.' 5 The principle in this
situation is one of preventing unjust enrichment of the secured creditor who
has had the value of the collateral increased from nothing or nearly nothing
to a greater value. Thus, because the value of the creditor's collateral is
actually increased, there can be no taking. On appeal, the New Jersey
Appellate Court affirmed and stated that "[w]hatever diminution in value
may have occurred to affect plaintiff's security interest was as the result of
the acts of polluting the property. Therefore, whatever property, if any, was
'taken' was taken by the dischargers of the hazardous substances and not
by the State.' 126
A similar situation, which also would militate against a finding of an
unconstitutional taking, is that in which the secured creditor again has
security only in the contaminated land. In this case, however, the bankruptcy
petition is filed before any cleanup activities occur on the land. Because the
value'2 7 of the secured creditor's interest is determined at the time of the
121. 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326
(1984).
122. N.J. Water Pollution Control Laws, 58 N.J. STAT. ANNt. § 58:10-23.l1f(f) (1981). For
the current version of the statute, see supra note 88.
123. Kessler, 191 N.J. Super. at 288, 466 A.2d at 589. Since the assignee took the mortgage
after the effective date of the statute, the rights associated with the mortgage were not impaired
by any law subsequently enacted.
124. Kessler, 191 N.J. Super. at 298, 304-05, 466 A.2d at 596, 600.
125. Kessler, 191 N.J. Super. at 300-01, 466 A.2d at 597. See also Lockett, supra note 25,
at 889 ("In this context, the concept underlying superpriority is essentially one of avoiding ...
unjust enrichment .... ).
126. Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 147, 476 A.2d at 332.
127. The value of a secured interest "shall be determined in light of the purpose of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property.." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
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filing of the bankruptcy claim,'u if the contaminated waste site is determined
to have no value, there can be no taking of the property. 2 9
A constitutional problem does arise, however, if the superlien statute is
applied toward a secured creditor who has a property interest of value which
was secured before the enactment of the statute. The United States Supreme
Court held in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford3" that retroactive
application of a bankruptcy provision against a secured creditor violates the
taking clause of the fifth amendment. Radford involved the Frazier-Lemke
Act,' which operated retroactively to allow a debtor to purchase his own
property from the mortgagee bank at less than fair market value. 3 2 The
Court held that the Act effected a "taking of substantive rights in property
acquired by the Bank prior to" enactment. 33 In Radford, the Court stated
that "the Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's
need, private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use
without just compensation.' ' 134
Another case, Armstrong v. United States, 131 supports the argument against
retroactive application of the superlien statutes. In Armstrong, materialmen
delivered materials to a prime contractor for use in building Navy boats.
Under state law, the materialmen obtained liens in the vessels. The prime
contractor defaulted on his obligations to the United States, and the gov-
ernment took possession of the uncompleted hulls and unused materials.
This made it impossible for the materialmen to enforce their liens. In holding
the government's action to constitute a taking, the Court stated that "[tihe
total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which con-
stitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amend-
ment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory
measure."1 36
The Court's position in Radford and Armstrong was recently reaffirmed
in United States v. Security Industrial Bank.13 7 The case involved the ret-
roactive application of section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 38 Section
522(0 invalidates nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens on certain prop-
128. See Lockett, supra note 25, at 887.
129. This situation raises the possibility that the trustee may be able to avoid the statutory
superlien under section 545(2) of the Code. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
130. Radford, 295 U.S. 555.
131. Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934), as codified, 11 U.S.C. § 203, repealed
by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682.
132. Radford, 295 U.S. at 591-93.
133. Id. at 590.
134. Id. at 602.
135. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
136. Id. at 48.
137. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1982).
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erty, including household appliances and furnishings.1l 9 In Security Industrial
Bank, the bank challenged the retroactive application of section 522(f) to
certain liens the bank held, claiming such retroactive application would
violate the taking clause of the fifth amendment. 140 Although the case was
ultimately decided on statutory construction grounds, the majority expressed
doubt that a secured creditor may be constitutionally dispossessed of his
property retroactively without just compensation. 41
The Supreme Court, in deciding Security Industrial Bank on statutory
grounds, relied on the principle that legislation should not be applied ret-
roactively unless Congress expresses a clear and unequivocal intent to the
contrary. 142 Although Security Industrial Bank involved retroactive appli-
cation of a federal bankruptcy statute, the principle and rationale requiring
legislative intent for retroactive application is equally forceful when applied
to state laws. 143 Therefore, where the state legislature has failed to specify
clearly that the superlien statute is to be applied retroactively, it may be
possible for a secured creditor who has a lien which was perfected before
the enactment of the statute to contest the statute on statutory construction
grounds, thereby avoiding the constitutional question altogether. 144
2. The DeBenedictis Decision and Its Implications for Superlien
Statutes
When viewed in light of the recent Supreme Court decision of Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 14s state superlien statutes should
139. See Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 72. See also Zarin, supra note 11, at 350.
140. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 73.
141. Id. at 78. In discussing the constitutional issue, the Court stated that although the
bundle of rights that accrues to a secured party is smaller than that which accrues to an owner
in fee simple, a secured interest does amount to property, thus affording the interest protection
under the fifth amendment. Id. at 76.
142. Id. at 79. The Court stated:
[T]he first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered as addressed
to the future, not to the past.... The rule has been expressed in varying degrees
of strength but always of one import, that a retrospective operation will not be
given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights ... unless such be "the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the
legislature."
Id. (quoting Union Pacific Ry. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)).
143. See Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 143, 476 A.2d at 329-30. In Kessler, the court stated:
When considering whether a statute should be applied prospectively or retroac-
tively, [the court's] quest is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature. In the
absence of an express declaration to the contrary, that search may lead to the
conclusion that a statute should be given only prospective effect. Conversely,
when the Legislature has clearly indicated that a statute should be given retroactive
effect, the courts will give it that effect unless it will violate the constitution or
result in a manifest injustice.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Zarin, supra note 11, at 351-55.
144. In Kessler, the court held the priority lien provision of the New Jersey Spill Act to
apply retroactively. 194 N.J. Super. at 142-43, 476 A.2d at 329-30 ("The legislature has expressly
declared that the Spill Act should be given retroactive effect.").
145. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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survive constitutional attack, except, again, in the case of a secured creditor
who has a property interest of value which was secured before enactment
of the statute. In DeBenedictis, the Court held that a Pennsylvania land use
regulation requiring coal operators to leave a certain amount of coal in the
land to prevent subsidence did not effect a taking under the fifth amend-
ment. 4 6 The Court first distinguished on two grounds the landmark taking
case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 47 which, sixty-five years ago, held
that a similar statute did effect a taking. 48 First, said the DeBenedictis
majority, the nature of the government action in Mahon was different than
that in DeBenedictis. In Mahon, the Court noted, the statute was designed
to protect private property, and the damage complained of was not common
or public. 149 Furthermore, the regulation in Mahon denied the coal company
economically viable use of its property. 50 In DeBenedictis, by contrast,
Pennsylvania was acting pursuant to its police powers "to arrest what it
[saw as] a significant threat to the common welfare." 15' Additionally, in
DeBenedictis, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the Act
prevented the coal company from profitably engaging in its business or that
there was an undue interference with investment-backed expectatong152
In DeBenedictis, the Court discussed the nature of inquiry under the taking
clause, recognizing that there is no "set formula" for determining when a
taking has occurred. 53 The Court did, however, identify factors it has relied
upon in past cases involving taking questions: (1) the character of the
government action, (2) the economic impact of the regulation, and (3) the
regulation's interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. 5 4
When the superlien statutes are viewed in light of the factors discussed in
DeBenedictis, the state superlien legislation appears to be constitutional,
except when applied retroactively to secured creditors.
Looking at the nature of the government action necessarily involves a
discussion of the state's police powers and the policies underlying those
powers. Where the state is acting pursuant to its police powers to protect
the general public in some way, the Court has been hesitant to find a taking.'55
In traditional nuisance cases, the Court has been reluctant to find that
146. Id.
147. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
148. Id.
149. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by three other members of the Court dissented,
finding the majority's attempt at distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal unpersuasive. Id. at 153-61
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1247 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1245.
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governmental restraints on property use amount to a compensable taking. 156
The police power argument is based on cases which deal with situations
where the affected party is directly responsible for, or involved in the activity
which must be abated for the good of the community.1 17 The justification
for allowing the government to restrict the use of property rests upon the
idea that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community." 158 When
the owner fails to live up to that obligation, the state is empowered to step
in and take the necessary steps to abate the nuisance.15 9 Thus, with superliens,
it is clear that when superliens are applied to parties directly responsible for
creating the dangerous condition at the hazardous waste site, the parties
would be precluded from claiming that a taking has occurred, because
pursuant to its police powers, the state is empowered to take action to
prevent the nuisance from continuing. 6°
In In re Quanta Resources Corp.,61 the majority addressed the police
power issue only in passing in a footnote and stated:
[We are not persuaded by the Trustee's argument that an unconstitu-
tional taking could result from forbidding abandonment here .... [Tihe
state's enforcement of its environmental protection laws cannot be char-
acterized as a taking; rather it is a permissible exercise of the state's
regulatory power to promote the public good, under a long line of cases
dealing with just that distinction.162
Justice Gibbons, dissenting, criticized the majority for its conclusory state-
ment concerning the police power and said the cases cited by the majority
156. See id. at 1244-45 nn.18, 20. In DeBenedictis, the Court quoted Mugler v. Kansas, and
stated:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared,
by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the com-
munity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of
property.... The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by in-
dividuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the
safety of the public, is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of
organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must
compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by
reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict
injury upon the community.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1244 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
157. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1256 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[W]e have recognized
that a taking does not occur where the government exercises its unquestioned authority to
prevent a property owner from using his property to injure others without having to compensate
the value of the forbidden use."). See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempsted, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (town
ordinance limiting the use of land for mining held not to be a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928) (statute requiring landowner to destroy diseased trees held not to be a taking).
158. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1245 (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665).
159. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664-65.
160. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 395.
161. 739 F.2d 912 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
162. Id. at 922 n.l1 (citations omitted).
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in support of its position did not address the issue of an obligation on the
part of innocent third-party creditors to undertake compliance with the police
power statutes. 6 3 The Supreme Court did not address the police power issue
when it decided the appeal of the Quanta case. 64
Secured creditors who acquired their secured interest after the passage of
the superlien statute present a compelling, but not insurmountable, challenge
to superliens. Although the secured creditor might argue that enforcing the
superlien provision would interfere with the creditor's reasonable investment-
backed expectations, this argument is not persuasive. So long as the superlien
provision is enacted before the creditor lends money to the hazardous waste
operator, the creditor will be deemed to have constructive notice of the
legislation. 65 Therefore, the creditor is on notice that its claim or lien may
be subordinated to the state in the event the state cleans up the hazardous
waste site. Because the creditor knows, or should know, of this possibility,
it should figure this factor into its investment expectations and assess the
risks accordingly. Such risks may be passed on to consumers (borrowers) in
the form of higher interest rates.
By allowing the state's claim to take priority over the secured creditors
who had notice, beneficial consequences and policies are promoted. First,
because the creditor knows that its claim may be subordinated to the gov-
ernment, it will be more likely to conduct a thorough background investi-
gation to determine whether the hazardous waste operator is complying with
applicable regulations. 66 The creditor is also more likely to ensure that the
operator is operating his site in accordance with the law. 6 7 Furthermore,
because the operator knows that lenders will be more diligent and cautious
both in their background investigations before lending money and in their
ongoing relations with the operator, the operator will have a greater incentive
to comply with the law.
In DeBenedictis, the majority indicated that the regulation in question was
a permissible exercise of the state's police power because the statute did not
simply involve the balancing of private economic interests of the coal com-
panies against the interests of surface owners.1 6 8 Instead, by examining the
legislative purpose of the Act, 69 as well as its operation, the Court agreed
163. Id. at 925 n.3 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
164. Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494.
165. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (legislature need do nothing more
than enact and publish the law and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize
itself with its terms and to comply).
166. See Comment, supra note 11, at 1009.
167. Id.
168. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
169. Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Coal Subsidence Act provides:
This act shall be deemed to be an exercise of the police powers of the Common-
wealth for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the people
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with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the Common-
wealth was "acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment,
and the fiscal integrity of the area.' 7 0 The coal company argued that a
provision of the Act that required the company to pay money to surface
owners for reclamation of their land was unnecessary because the Com-
monwealth administered an insurance program which would reimburse the
owners for any expenses they incurred in repairing their land.'7' The Court
rejected this argument, however, because the argument presumed that the
statute was designed to protect private parties' rights. 72 The Court found
that the purpose underlying the statute was to prevent the damage from
occurring in the first place and to encourage restoration of the land if damage
did occur. 7 1 Placing the financial responsibility on the coal operators, the
Court said, would accomplish this goal more effectively than simply relying
upon an insurance fund to reimburse the owners. 7 4 The Court, therefore,
rejected the company's taking claim, holding that the government's action
was amply justified by the public purposes served by the Act. 7 5
In a similar way, some may argue that the better way to ensure that
hazardous waste sites are cleaned up would be to increase the amount of
money that industry is required to contribute to a state "superfund" used
to pay for cleaning up waste sites. 7 6 Assuming that at least one of the goals
of the superlien statutes is to prevent or reduce unsafe waste disposal prac-
tices, the argument fails for the same reason the majority found the coal
company's argument unpersuasive in DeBenedictis. Simply requiring industry
to pour additional money into a cleanup fund does nothing to deter operators
from their unlawful conduct. As discussed above, notifying lenders that the
state's lien may take priority provides incentives for both the operators and
lenders to be more cautious and diligent in their practices with hazardous
waste operations. Furthermore, in examining the purposes of legislation, the
Court's "inquiry into legislative purpose is not intended as a license to judge
of the Commonwealth, by providing for the conservation of surface land areas
which may be affected in the mining of bituminous coal by methods other than
"open pit" or "strip" mining, to aid in the protection of the safety of the public,
to enhance the value of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of
surface water drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the
use and enjoyment of such lands and to maintain primary jurisdiction over surface
coal mining in Pennsylvania.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986), quoted in DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at
1242.
170. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1243, 1253.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1243, 1251.
176. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 398-99.
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the effectiveness of legislation. . . . '[W]hether in fact the provisions will
accomplish the objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement]
is satisfied if ... the ... [State] Legislature rationally could have believed
that the [Act] would promote its objective.' ",,7 Under this deferential
standard, it seems highly unlikely that a court would find that the state
legislature could not have rationally believed that the superlien would pro-
mote its objective.
In the case of a secured creditor who acquired a security interest of value
before the enactment of the superlien, allowing the state's lien to take priority
would violate the fifth amendment. Even if the argument in this context
relying upon Radford, Armstrong, and Security National Bank is not ac-
cepted, an analysis under DeBenedictis compels a finding that, if applied
retroactively, the superliens violate the fifth amendment. In DeBenedictis,
the Court said that there was no showing that the petitioner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations had been materially affected by the statute. 178
With a secured creditor who acquires a security interest of value before the
enactment of the statute, however, the creditor's investment-backed expec-
tations are not simply unduly interfered with, they are completely frustrated.
The secured creditor has no notice of the possibility that the state's lien
might take priority. As a result, without Delphic powers, there is no reason
for the creditor to figure this risk into the investment calculations. Because
the creditor has no knowledge of the possible retroactive application of the
statute, the reason for applying the statute to other secured creditors does
not apply in this case. 179 The creditor does not know that the state's lien
could take priority, and consequently, the creditor has no incentive to be
more diligent in its background investigation or ongoing relations with the
hazardous waste site operator.
While some may argue that the superlien statutes represent only an attempt
to protect the state's pecuniary interest, and do not enable the state to clean
up a waste site,'80 this view is rather short-sighted. Given the expense of
cleaning up a waste site,' 8' it seems unlikely the state could continue cleaning
up waste sites without recovering the costs of previous or ongoing cleanups.
Thus, allowing superliens to take priority against secured creditors with notice
of the statute enables the state to continue to perform its vital role of
protecting the public from the dangers of hazardous wastes, and does not
constitute a taking.
177. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1255-56 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
178. Id. at 1249-50.
179. See Zarin, supra note 11, at 355.
180. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 395.
181. See supra note 17.
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B. Contracts Clause Problems
An issue which is closely related to the takings question is whether en-
actment and enforcement of the state superlien statutes violates the contracts
clause of the Constitution. 182 In DeBenedictis, the Court rejected a challenge
to the Pennsylvania Coal Subsidence Act under the contracts clause of the
Constitution. 8 3 The Coal Company claimed that it had obtained damage
waivers for a large percentage of the land surface protected by the Subsidence
Act, but that the Act removed the surface owners' contractual obligations
to waive damages.' s4 The Court began its discussion by pointing out that
"it is well-settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of
contracts is not to be read literally.' ' s5 The Court went on to explain that
the contracts clause was not intended to destroy the states' police powers,
which protect the general public's health and welfare.' 6
In examining the legislation, the DeBenedictis Court followed the approach
taken in Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co.,187
which set out a three-tiered standard for determining whether an unconsti-
tutional impairment of contract has occurred. 8 The first step is to identify
the particular contractual right impaired, and the nature of the impairment. 8 9
The Court found there to be a substantial impairment of a contract right
of waiver, and proceeded to the next step, justifications for the impairment.' 9°
The Court examined the purpose or interest that the legislation was designed
to serve and found that Pennsylvania had a "strong public interest" in
preventing the destruction of property and water courses, which would have
occurred had the subsidence been allowed. 19'
Under the final step, a court must determine whether the legislation is
based upon reasonable conditions and is appropriate to the purpose of its
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
183. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1251-53. Because Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his
dissent that the Pennsylvania Act violated the fifth amendment's taking clause, he did not
address the contracts clause issue. Id. at 1261 n.9.
184. Id. at 1252.
185. Id. at 1251 (citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934)).
186. The Court stated:
It is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate
to obliterate the police power of the States.... [The police power] is an exercise
of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals,
comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under
contracts between individuals.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1251-52 (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398, 445 (1934)).
187. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
188. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1252-53.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1252.
191. Id.
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adoption. 192 In this inquiry, the DeBenedictis Court showed considerable
deference to the state legislature: "[We have repeatedly held that unless the
State is itself a contracting party, courts should, 'properly defer to legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure.' "9
The Court found that the purpose underlying the statute was to prevent
damage from occurring to the land in the first place and to encourage
restoration of the land if damage did occur. 94 Relying upon its earlier
discussion of the Commonwealth's goals in passing the Subsidence Act, 195
the Court found that requiring coal operators to repair damage or pay
landowners for the damage done was an appropriate and reasonable action
by the legislature to accomplish its goals of deterrence and protecting the
environment from future harm. 196 The Court refused to second-guess the
Commonwealth's determination that placing the financial responsibility on
the coal operators would accomplish these goals more effectively than simply
relying upon an insurance fund to reimburse the owners. 97 The Court,
therefore, rejected the company's contract clause claim, holding that the
impairment was amply justified by the public purposes served by the Act. 9
Examining the superliens in light of DeBenedictis, they would appear to
survive constitutional challenge under the contracts clause. The first inquiry
under the test-whether a substantial impairment of a contract right has
occurred-is rather easily satisfied. The superliens interfere with, or impair,
the creditor's right to repayment, for which it contracted.199 Under the second
step of the test, it is necessary to determine what interest the state is pro-
moting, and whether that interest is significant or legitimate. A forceful
argument certainly exists that a state has a "strong public interest" in
remedying the dangers posed by abandoned hazardous waste sites. Although
it may be argued that the states are simply protecting a pecuniary interest
in the property,2m the very fact that the states have passed such legislation
is at least some evidence that the provision is necessary to ensure cleanup
of other waste sites in the future. Furthermore, given the Supreme Court's
finding in DeBenedictis that preventing subsidence in coal mining operations
satisfies the requirement that the statute be significant or legitimate, it seems
192. Id. at 1253 (quoting Energy Reserve Group, 459 U.S. at 412).
193. Id. at 1253 (quoting Energy Reserve Group, 459 U.S. at 418 (quoting United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977))).
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
196. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1253.
197. Id.
198. Id. See also supra note 175 and accompanying text.
199. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 431 ("The obligations of a contract are impaired by a law
which renders them invalid, or releases or extinguishes them and impairment, . . . has been
predicated of laws which without destroying contracts derogate from substantial contractual
rights." (citation omitted)).
200. See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 395.
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doubtful that a court would find that an effort to protect the public from
the dangers posed by poorly managed hazardous waste sites does not satisfy
that requirement.
Superlien statutes also meet the third requirement under the contracts
clause analysis-that the legislation be based upon reasonable conditions and
is appropriate to the purpose of its adoption. The underlying consideration
which must be remembered is the Supreme Court's great deference to the
judgment of the state legislature concerning the necessity and reasonableness
of a particular measure. 201 State legislatures have recognized the dangers
posed by poorly managed waste sites and have sought to protect the public
from those dangers by cleaning up the sites. Allowing the state's lien to
take priority enables the state to recover its costs, ensuring that the state
can continue its cleanup activities in the future, as well as providing a
deterrent to mismanagement of waste sites. 202 While some might argue that
there are other less intrusive methods of accomplishing the legislature's
goals, 203 that argument is off the mark because it ignores the deference to
be given to state legislatures by a reviewing court. Under this deferential
standard, the question essentially is whether the legislature could rationally
believe that the superlien statutes could accomplish the goal of protecting
the environment by ensuring the state is reimbursed for hazardous waste
site cleanups and by deterring future mismanagement of waste sites.20 It
seems unlikely that a court would find that the legislature could not rationally
believe that superliens would serve the purposes being pursued. 2 5
In Kessler v. Tarrats, the appellate court of New Jersey affirmed the trial
court's holding that New Jersey's superlien provision did not constitute an
unconstitutional impairment of contract. The court held the legislature's
action to be a valid exercise of the police powers:
201. See supra notes 177, 193 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
203. One possibility is to increase the amount of money industry must contribute to state
cleanup funds (superfunds). See Note, Priority Lien Statutes, supra note 11, at 398. The author
implies that the state must prove that there is "no feasible alternative" to the superlien in
order for it to survive a contracts clause challenge. Id. at 393 ("The state may find it difficult
to argue that there are no feasible alternatives to the superlien."). This is a stricter standard
than courts have applied. See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1253.
204. Although the rational relationship test has applied in the taking clause analysis rather
than in the contracts clause analysis, the DeBenedictis Court relied at least in part on its taking
analysis in deciding that the legislation was appropriate and reasonable. See supra note 177
and accompanying text. It does not seem to be a great leap, therefore, to assert that in a
challenge under the contracts clause, the Court will apply the same or a similar, rational belief
test to the legislature's act as it does under the taking analysis. Some commentators argue that
the analysis under the taking clause and the contracts clause is basically the same. See Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV.
692, 695 (1960).
205. See Zarin, supra note 11, at 352 (arguing that courts will defer to legislative judgment
unless the results are unduly arbitrary and unjust).
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The [superlien] provision serves the legitimate public purpose of en-
hancing the Spill Fund's remedial capabilities by increasing the oppor-
tunities to recoup clean up expenditures. Even if the application of that
priority lien provision results in some impairment of contract, it may
nevertheless be permitted because of the strong police power and public
interest rationale underlying the enactment.2
Thus, at least one court has found the superlien statute to be an appropriate
way to remedy the dangers of poorly managed hazardous waste sites, without
unconstitutionally impairing contracts.
CONCLUSION
Until Congress acts to amend the Bankruptcy Code in a way that would
more likely ensure that state governments can recover their costs for cleaning
a hazardous waste site, states should take the necessary action of ensuring
reimbursement by passing statutory liens giving them a priority lien against
a bankrupt estate. When applied to operators or responsible parties of
hazardous waste sites or secured creditors whose interest was perfected after
the passage of the superlien legislation, the superlien statutes should be held
to be a valid exercise of the states' police powers, and not constitute a taking
under the fifth amendment. The overarching goal of protecting the public
from the dangers of hazardous waste is furthered by ensuring that the state
will be able to recoup its cleanup expenses, thus allowing cleanups to continue
in the future. Furthermore, by allowing the state's lien to take priority over
a secured creditor who has notice of the superlien statute, lenders will be
encouraged to lend money only to operators who are complying with the
law. Similarly, because operators are, or should be, aware of the increased
diligence by lenders, the operators will be encouraged to be responsible in
their waste storage practices in order to ensure they can obtain necessary
loans.
Examined in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision concerning taking
analysis, an unconstitutional taking does occur when the superlien statutes
are applied to secured creditors who have a property interest of value which
was secured before the passage of the statute. The creditor has no idea that
it might, in the future, have its lien subordinated to the state's. In this
situation, the lender's investment-backed expectations are destroyed, because
the lender has no reason to figure this risk into its calculations when de-
termining how much money to lend and at what interest rate. Furthermore,
there is no deterrent effect to be gained from telling a lender after the fact
that its lien will be subordinated to the state.
Although analysis under the contracts clause is very similar to that under
the taking clause, courts appear to give greater deference to states under
206. Kessler, 194 N.J. Super. at 146, 476 A.2d at 331-32.
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contracts clause analysis. As a result, application of a superlien even to a
secured creditor who had a secured interest before the enactment of the
statute probably would not violate the contracts clause, since a court could
rather easily assert that the legislation is reasonable and appropriate under
the circumstances, and represents a valid exercise of the state's police powers.
Given the large number of hazardous waste sites in the country and the
staggering costs involved in cleaning them up, states should take whatever
steps are necessary and permissible to ensure the public safety. Properly
drafted state superlien statutes represent a step in the right direction toward
eliminating the problems of ensuring cost recovery for cleaning up hazardous
waste sites. In drafting these statutes, state legislators should keep certain
considerations in mind. First, to avoid the constitutional challenge by a
secured creditor whose interest was perfected before the statute was passed,
the superlien statute should perhaps include some type of grandfather clause
which would exempt such creditors from the operation of the statute. Second,
the statute should provide that the state's lien is perfected on the date it is
filed with the proper state official. This eliminates any confusion surrounding
property purchases. Finally, the statutes should be unambiguous as to the
types of costs recoverable under the liens and the particular property to
which the lien attaches. Addressing these issues should help minimize the
difficulties which arise regarding these statutes.
DOUGLAS C. BALLANTINE
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